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This paper capitalizes on psycholinguistic evidence from real-time sentence 
comprehension to choose between two opposing positions on reflexivity: The 
syntax-only field on the one hand, and the syntax+discourse field on the other 
hand. The study presented here utilized a cross-modal paradigm to measure the 
amount of processing resources required for interpretation. The obtained data 
are in favor of a syntax+discourse approach to reflexivity, thus suggesting that 
logophoricity goes beyond syntax. The data reveal a significant contrast 
between so-called coargument reflexives (whose interpretation is purely 
syntactic) and logophoric reflexives (implying that their interpretation requires 









From a representational perspective, there are two competing positions on 
reflexivity. One position does not distinguish between the interpretation of the 
reflexive pronoun in (1a) and (1b) (syntax-only position), while the other 
position does (syntax+discourse position). 
 
(1) a. The lawyeri who was young defended himselfi. 
 b. The daughteri hid a present behind herselfi. 
 
The availability of two conflicting analyses of the same phenomenon opens the 
door for psycholinguistic evidence to provide support for one or the other.  
 In the experiment presented here, we investigate the process of 
interpretation of two different types of reflexive elements (in particular the 
contrast between the reflexive in a construction as in (1a) vs. that in (1b)). 
Specifically, we are interested in discovering how these reflexive elements 
establish reference, i.e. how they select their antecedent. 
This paper capitalizes on psycholinguistic findings from a real-time 
sentence processing study to choose between the two opposing positions. 
Crucial to this study is the observation that the language processor is extremely 
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sensitive to different kinds of linguistic representations, and the results of the 
study thus enable us to select one position on the nature of the interpretation of 
reflexive pronouns over the other. 
 
 
2. Representational Considerations 
 
So how is reflexivity represented within the two positions, and what is the 
nature of the contrast between the two assumed types of reflexive pronouns? 
The representational contrast between the two reflexives surfaces in a more 
obvious way when we consider their distribution with pronouns. According to 
Standard Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), reflexives and pronouns are in 
complementary distribution. Consider the following pairs: 
 
(2) a. The golferi who beat Sue applauded himselfi. 
 b. *The golferi who beat Sue applauded himi. 
(3) a. The womani wrapped a blanket around herselfi. 
 b. The womani wrapped a blanket around heri. 
 
The proclaimed complementarity is only true for the pair in (2), where the 
pronoun in (2b) cannot be interpreted as referring to the golfer. In contrast, the 
reflexive in (3a) can be replaced by a pronoun – as in (3b) – with both elements 
selecting the woman as their antecedent. This should not be possible. 
In the following, two approaches to this dilemma are outlined. One 
approach, the syntax-only position, exploits syntactic mechanisms to account 
for the interpretation of both of the reflexive pronouns in (2a) and (3a). The 
other approach, the syntax+discourse position, claims that syntax does not 
suffice for interpretation in the case of (3a). 
 
 
2.1. Syntax-only position 
 
Within the syntax-only position, there have been a number of attempts to solve 
the problem of the non-complementary distribution observed in (3) above (e.g. 
Chomsky 1986, Huang 1983, Hestvik 1991). One of these approaches is the 
introduction of subjectless binding domains (Hestvik 1991), which provides an 
extension of the Standard Binding Theory. 
In Binding Theory, the binding domain of LVWKHVPDOOHVW;3FRQWDLQLQJ DQG
either a SUBJECT RU , WKDW DVVLJQV QRPLQDWLYH FDVH WR  WKXV WKH JRYHUQLQJ
category must contain a SUBJECT. A governing category in Binding Theory then 
can only be IP or NP with a subject. Modifying these requirements, the 
extension suggested by Hestvik’s pro osal removes the reference to SUBJECT 
from the binding domain. For the purposes of this paper, prepositional phrases 
(PPs) are considered to represent such subjectless binding domains, which then 
can account for the non-complementarity of the reflexive and the pronoun in 
the PP in (3) above: If LVDSURQRXQLWFDQEHIUHHLQWKHVXEMHFWOHVVELQGLQJ
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GRPDLQ 33 KRZHYHU LI  LV D UHIOH[LYH LWPXVW EH ERXQGZLWKLQ LWV ELQGLQJ
domain (for a detailed discussion see Hestvik (1991)).  
Under this framework, the reflexive in (3a) must extend its binding domain to 
the containing clause, because there is no potential binder in the PP. It is hence 
proposed that the interpretation of the reflexive in (3a) involves LF-movement: 
The reflexive establishes a connection with its antecedent (woman) by moving 
at LF.1  
The interpretation of both the reflexive in (3a) and that in (2a) is thus 
accounted for by syntactic operations alone. The syntax-only position therefore 
does not distinguish between the representation of the reflexive in (2a) and that 
in (3a). This suggests that the two types of reflexives should pattern alike 
during sentence comprehension. 
 
 
2.2. Syntax+discourse position 
 
By contrast, the syntax+discourse position, distinguishes between the two 
reflexives on representational grounds (Reinhart & Reuland 1993, Pollard & 
Sag 1992, among others). One approach within this position is the Reflexivity 
Theory (Reinhart & Reuland 1993). Here, reflexives are not defined on the 
basis of strictly local considerations (i.e. binding conditions), but in terms of 
conditions on predicates.2 The following examples demonstrate the relevance 
of these conditions for the objectives of this paper: 
 
(4) a. The lawyeri who was young defended himselfi. 
 b. The daughteri hid a present behind herselfi. 
 
In (4a) the reflexive himself selects the lawyer as its antecedent; both reflexive 
and antecedent are arguments of the predicate defend, i.e. they are coarguments 
of the same predicate. In contrast, in (4b) the reflexive herself selects the 
daughter as its antecedent, but the reflexive is an argument of the predicate 
behind, while the antecedent is an argument of the predicate hid. This has been 
                                                           
1 The proposed LF-movement of reflexives mirrors the operations involved in clitic-movement 
(as put forth by Kayne’s (1975) analysis of French pronominal clitics). Along these lines, Chomsky 
(1986:175) has also suggested a LF-movement for English reflexives. 
2 In particular, condition A of the Reflexivity Theory states that a reflexive-marked predicate is 
reflexive. This assumes first that a predicate is reflexive if and only if two of its arguments are 
coindexed (definition (a)), and second that a predicate is reflexive-marked if […] one of the 
predicate’s arguments is a SELF anaphor (definition (b)) (Reinhart & Reuland 1993). To illustrate 
these definitions of Reflexivity Theory, consider the following examples: 
(i)  *Maxi criticized himi. 
(ii)  *Max i criticized Maxi.    
(iii)    Maxi criticized himselfi.    
In all three examples, the predicate is reflexive because two of its arguments are coindexed 
[definition (a) above]. Furthermore, only the predicate in (iii) is reflexive-marked; the predicate in 
(i) and (ii) is not reflexive-marked, because him and Max do not represent SELF anaphors 
[definition (b) above]. Since both definitions must be satisfied, only (iii) is considered grammatical. 
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noted by Reinhart & Reuland who claim that “in the case of locative and 
directional PPs […], the P[reposition] forms its own predicate” (1993:686). 
The reflexive is therefore an argument of the preposition behind and not of the 
verb. Crucially then, the reflexive and the antecedent in (4b) are not 
coarguments of the same predicate.  
 The representational distinction that can be drawn from these observations 
is such that the reflexive in (4a), which is a coargument with its antecedent, can 
be interpreted on syntactic grounds alone (henceforth coargument reflexive). 
However, for the reflexive in (4b), which does not share the same predicate 
with its antecedent, syntax is not sufficient for interpretation. The latter requires 
information beyond syntax for the establishment of the correct referent. Such 
reflexives are known as logophoric reflexives.3 
 
2.2.1. Discourse level 
 
The remaining question is what constitutes the extra information that goes 
beyond syntax and that must be accessed in the course of the interpretation of 
logophoric reflexives. It is suggested that this extra-syntactic information is 
discourse-related (Reinhart & Reuland 1993:689, Sells 1987, et al.), where 
discourse is understood as a level of representation (e.g. Heim 1982, Avrutin 
1999). 
 One discourse-oriented framework for the interpretation of (logophoric) 
reflexives is provided by Sells (1987). He suggests that at the level of discourse 
representation, certain discourse functions are accessed for interpretation, 
specifically the ‘source’, ‘self’, and ‘pivot’/‘point of view’. A logophoric 
reflexive thus establishes a link to a certain NP because this NP is associated 
with a specific internal perspective. The antecedent of a logophoric reflexive is 
hence conceived with particular reference to its point-of-view: 
 
(5) SOURCE: one who is the intentional agent of the communication 
 SELF: one whose mental state or attitude the content of the preposition 
describes  
PIVOT: one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of 
the proposition is evaluated (Sells 1987:457) 
 
The following examples from Icelandic ((6), from Sells 1987:450) and English 
(7&8) demonstrate these discourse notions: 
 
(6) a. Hanni  sagDi aD sigi vantaDi hæfileika. 
 He said that self lacked ability 
 ‘Hei said that hei lacked ability.’ 
                                                          
3 Now, the correspondence with pronouns, which has been pointed out with respect to the 
phenomenon of non-complementarity in the introduction, should become more apparent: 
logophoric reflexives are SELF anaphors that occur in non-reflexive (pronominal) contexts (i.e. they 
are free, such as pronouns, since they do not share the same predicate with their antecedents). 
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 b. *Honumi var sagt aD sigi vantaDi hæfileika. 
 He was told that self lacked ability 
 ‘Hei was told that hei lacked ability.’ 
 
In Icelandic, the logophoric element sig must refer to the entity that is marked 
as SOURCE at the discourse level. The semantics of the verb in (6) is such that 
the subject must be represented in the discourse as SOURCE, i.e. the one who 
intentionally says something. However, in the passive construction (6b), honum 
is not marked as SOURCE of the communication, and coindexation of sig and 
honum thus yields an ungrammatical interpretation. 
  
(7) Maxi boasted that the queen invited Lucie and himselfi to the tea. 
 
The example in (7) represents an instance of the discourse notion SELF. For the 
interpretation of the logophoric reflexive himself, reference to the mental state 
of Max is needed. Finally, the notion of PIVOT can be exemplified by the 
locative PP constructions that have been used in the study reported here: 
 
(8) The womani put a towel around herselfi. 
 
The logophoric reflexive herself is interpreted with respect to the woman’s 
spatial and temporal location. The action verb put depicts a motion of the 
antecedent whose perspective is required for complete interpretation. 
To conclude, the common denominator of the (logophoric) reflexives in the 
examples above can be summarized in the observation that their interpretation 
incorporates a representation of the antecedent’s thoughts, attitudes, or 
perspective. This has also been discussed by Hagège (1974), who coined the 
term ‘logophoric’, Cantral (1974), Clements (1975), and Banfield (1982), 
among others.  
Assuming that the interpretation of logophoric reflexives involves non-
syntactic operations, such as access to the discourse notions of point-of-view, 
while the interpretation of coargument reflexives is merely achieved via 
syntactic operations, the syntax+discourse position differentiates between the 
two reflexives (i.e. coargument and logophoric reflexive). This leads to the 
hypothesis that a contrast should also obtain in the course of processing these 
two types of reflexives. 
 
 
3. Processing considerations 
 
Before the divergent hypotheses of the two positions can be investigated on the 
basis of psycholinguistic findings, a number of assumptions about the language 
processor must be clarified. These considerations form the foundation for the 
predictions and interpretation of the results that will be postulated with respect 
to the processing of the reflexives. 
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3.1. Antecedent reactivation 
 
Psycholinguistic studies have shown that an antecedent is activated during the 
interpretation of pronouns and traces in real-time sentence comprehension. In 
particular, priming experiments have greatly contributed to these findings, 
which capitalize on the notion that lexical decisions to related probes are faster 
than lexical decisions to unrelated probes at the position of the pronoun or 
trace, where the antecedent is expected to be assigned (e.g. Nicol & Swinney 
1989, Bever & McElree 1988, MacDonald 1989). Consider the following 
examples: 
 
(9) a. The boxeri told the skierj that the doctork for the team would blame 
himi/j/*k for the recent injury. 
 b. The boxeri told the skierj that the doctork for the team would blame 
himself*i/*j/k for the recent injury. 
 
It has been found that in sentences such as (9) which have a number of 
potential antecedents (i.e. the NPs of the sentence: the boxer, the skier, the 
doctor), reactivation of only the structurally acceptable antecedent is observed. 
Thus, for instance (9b) elicits reactivation of the antecedent doctor, but not of 
boxer or skier. (This is measured by the visual presentation of a semantically 
related word (e.g. nurse for the antecedent doctor, or snow for skier) 
immediately after hearing the pronoun.) 
 For the purposes of this paper, it can then be assumed that in the course of 
interpretation, a reflexive must reaccess its antecedent for the establishment of 
reference. In addition, the evidence from reactivation of antecedents signals 




3.2. Levels of information in real-time 
 
In order to choose between one of the two representational theories by drawing 
on observations from sentence processing, it is relevant to make certain 
assumptions on the architecture of the language processor. Since one 
characteristic feature of the interpretation of logophoric reflexives is the 
observation that they behave like pronouns in that they require access to 
discourse or extra-syntactic information, one question is how different levels of 
information are represented in the processing system. A second question is how 
the different levels interact with each other, i.e. how the language processor 
operates during real-time sentence comprehension. 
A recent finding has been that the parser operates locally first (Abney & 
Johnson 1991). As a consequence, processes of interpretation that take place 
within the level of syntactic representation alone take precedence over 
interpretation that demand access to other levels of representation. As a result, 
a switch between different levels of information should be observable. And 
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indeed, we assume that such a switch takes place and is reflected by a cost to 
the processing system.  
This assumption is supported by a considerably large body of 
psycholinguistic evidence for the existence of different levels of linguistic 
information. In particular, a contrast has been observed for the processing of 
syntactic versus extra-syntactic information. For instance, such a contrast has 
been found for semantic and syntactic information. In one study, it has been 
shown that the access of lexico-semantic content is costlier than that of lexico-
syntactic content (Shapiro, Zurif & Grimshaw 1987, 1989). 
A second study, which investigated a phenomenon known as aspectual 
coercion, has revealed that processing of combinatorial semantic operations is 
costlier to the processor in instances where it arises out of syntactically opaque 
(enriched) contexts - e.g. (10a) - than where it arises out of syntactically 
transparent ones - e.g. (10b) - (Piñango, Zurif & Jackendoff 1999): 
 
(10) a. The tiger jumped for an hour. 
 b. The tiger slept for an hour. 
 
For the verb phrase in (10b), syntactic information suffices in the process of 
interpretation. On the other hand, (10a) is semantically encoded and requires an 
(intrinsic) temporal component for its interpretation (in particular, the repetition 
function of the action jump for the time period of one hour). Semantically 
enriched sentences (10a) have been found to impose a higher cost on the 
processor than those in (10b).  
Finally, a number of studies have investigated the contrast between the 
processing of discourse-linked (referential) wh-pronouns (11b) and that of non-
discourse-linked (non-referential) wh-pronouns (11a) (De Vincenzi 1991, 1996, 
Shapiro 2000): 
  
(11) The soldier is pushing the unruly student violently into the street.  
 a. Whoi is the soldier pushing ti violently into the street? 
 b. Which studenti is the soldier pushing ti violently into the street? 
 
Processing data have shown that reactivation of related probes (compared to 
unrelated probes) is delayed for the discourse-linked which-NP in (11b). In 
particular, reactivation of non-discourse linked wh-pronouns (such as (11a)) – 
measured as reaction time to a secondary lexical decision (see below for a 
discussion of the dual task paradigm) – has been statistically significant at the 
position of the trace, while reactivation of discourse-linked wh-phrases (such as 
(11b)) has been found significant at a (later) post-gap position (after viol ntly in 
the example above). These findings are understood to imply that an extra cost 
is exerted during the access of a level of discourse representation, which 
crucially is only required for the interpretation of the discourse-linked wh-
phrase (11b). 
All this evidence supports the notion that the architecture of the sentence 
processor consists of various levels of information, and that access to these 
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levels places a computational burden on the language processor. Sentence 
comprehension is thus a process that results in cost to the system as a whole, 
and it is possible to measure this cost, for instance, by implementing the cross-
modal lexical decision interference paradigm (see below). In what follows, this 
notion is investigated through the window of logophoricity. 
 
4. Reflexivity and real-time comprehension 
 
The representational considerations and the processing considerations can now 
be brought together. The two competing positions on the representation of 
reflexivity make different predictions concerning the processing of coargument 
and logophoric reflexives. Under the syntax-only position, it is hypothesized 
that the two reflexives exhibit similar behavior; whereas in the context of the 
syntax+discourse position, a contrast is expected. These predictions are now 






We used the cross-modal lexical decision interference paradigm. In this 
paradigm, the subject performs two tasks: a comprehension task (primary task) 
and a lexical decision task (secondary task). The subject is presented auditorily 
with a sentence, and the primary task of the subject is to listen carefully and 
understand each sentence. To assure that the task is performed properly, the 
subject has to respond to comprehension questions at random points in the 
course of the experiment. At a certain point during the presentation of a given 
sentence, a letter string (probe), which is entirely unrelated to the sentence, is 
presented visually, upon which the subject has to decide (i.e. make a lexical 
decision for the probe) whether or not the letter string represents a word of 
English. The subject is instructed to perform this decision as quickly and as 
accurately as possible. The decision is indicated by pressing a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
button. The reaction time (RT) to the lexical decision is recorded (using Rtlab 
11x, (Swinney 1979)).4The logic of the interference paradigm is the following: 
it is assumed that the two tasks – comprehending a sentence and performing a 
lexical decision – compete for the same processing resources. Accordingly, 
since the two tasks compete for the same resources, the RT to the lexical 
decision task is an indicator for the processing resources required during the 
primary task of sentence comprehension (Shapiro, Zurif & Grimshaw 1987, 
1989). 
                                                          
4 Note that there are two versions of the cross-modal lexical decision paradigm. The one used 
in the experiment presented here is the interference paradigm (where a lexical decision is made to 
an unrelated probe). The other one is the facilitation paradigm, which has already been mentioned 
above with regard to the antecedent reactivation studies (where a lexical decision is made to a 
semantically related probe). 




Forty-five students recruited at Yale University participated in this study 
(eighteen subjects for the control position and twenty-seven subjects for the 
experimental position). All were native speakers of English with normal (or 
corrected-to-normal) visual and auditory acuity (by their own report) and had 




Twenty-five pairs of experimental sentences were constructed. Each pair 
consisted of a sentence with a coargument reflexive (12a) and one with a 
logophoric reflexive (12b). The latter included verbs that require an object (e.g. 
bug repellent) and a locative prepositional phrase introduced by behind or 
around. For each pair, the verbs were matched for frequency (Francis & 
Kucera 1982). In addition, the sentences were matched for total length, as well 
as for the distance between the antecedent and the reflexive. As an example, 
consider the following pair: 
 
(12) a. The womani who was arrogant praised * herselfi ^ because the network 
had called about negotiations for a leading role. 
 b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around * herselfi ^ because there were 
many mosquitoes in the Everglades.  
 
Two positions of the visual probe were tested (in two separate runs of the 
experiment). In the control position (*), the probe appeared before the 
reflexive; this position was tested to assure that no difference was observed up 
to the reflexive for both conditions in the sentence pair. In the experimental 
position (^), the probe was presented immediately after the reflexive. Twenty-
five pairs of probes were constructed for the experimental sentence pairs. A 
probe was chosen so that it was not semantically related to the content of the 
sentence, nor generated a continuation of the sentence in any meaningful way. 
For each experimental pair, the probe pair was matched for length as well as 
frequency to avoid any unpredictable interference due to the lexical decision 
task. Furthermore, probes exhibited diverse phonological properties across 
experimental pairs (Shapiro, Brookins, Gordon & Nagel 1991). The 
presentation of probe and sentence within a pair was counterbalanced over all 
subjects (i.e. one half of the subjects was presented with one probe of a pair, 
while the other half was presented with the other probe). For instance, for the 
pair in (13) & (14) the probe pair was SESSION and TEACHER, and half of the 
subjects were presented with SESSION in the coargument condition and 
TEACHER in the logophoric condition and vice versa. Furthermore, (13) presents 
the experimental sentences with the control position, and (14) presents them 
with the experimental position: 
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(13) a. The woman
i
 who was arrogant praised * herselfi because… 
SESSION 
 b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around * herselfi because…  
TEACHER 
(14) a. The womani who was arrogant praised herself i ^  because… 
SESSION 
 b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around herself i ^  because…   
TEACHER 
In addition to the fifty experimental sentences, one hundred and nineteen 
sentences and probes were created as fillers for the final version of the script.5 
Forty-two of these sentences were assigned word probes, and seventy-five were 
assigned nonword probes. The nonword probes were constructed to comply 
with English phonotactic rules (e.g. PURSHIP, FESSON, DIRLING). Probe 
positions were randomly varied in these sentences to decrease guessing on the 
part of the subjects. A script was then created with a total of 169 sentences. The 
experimental sentences were put in a quasi-random order, and the sequencing 
of the sentences within a pair was controlled in such a way that for half of the 
pairs the coargument condition preceded the logophoric condition (12) and for 
the other half it followed the logophoric condition (13). Moreover, at least two 






Under the assumption that the two tasks (understanding a sentence and 
performing a lexical decision) compete for the same processing resources, the 
reaction time (RT) to the lexical decision task is taken as an indication for the 
amount of processing resources required for the primary comprehension task. 
Specifically, the more resources are needed by the primary task, the higher is 
the RT to the secondary task (i.e. lexical decision). As a consequence, the 
comparison of the RTs to the lexical decision in the two conditions (i.e. 
coargument reflexives and logophoric reflexives) can be employed to decide 
between the two opposing representational accounts of reflexivity. 
If the comparison of the reaction times does not reveal a difference between 
the two conditions, the result might be taken to support the syntax-only 
position, which does not differentiate between the two reflexive conditions on a 
representational basis and claims that both reflexives are interpreted by 
syntactic means alone. This prediction follows from the observation that 
syntactic operations, no matter how complex they are or whether they vary in 
terms of their actual formation, do not impose differing degrees of 
                                                          
5 The odd number of filler sentences with word probes resulted from the inclusion of another 
experiment in the final script that is entirely unrelated to the current experiment. 
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computational load on the processor.6 The processing of either of the reflexive 
conditions should therefore not result in additional cost to the system. 
If, however, the comparison of the reaction times to the two conditions 
results in a significant difference between coargument and logophoric 
reflexives, such an outcome can be considered supportive evidence for the 
syntax+discourse position, which distinguishes between the two reflexive 
conditions on representational grounds. Again, this prediction is based on the 
observation that an increase in processing load cannot reflect the need for more 
syntactic information, but rather signals the need to access information beyond 
syntax in the process of interpretation, which is assumed by the 
syntax+discourse position for only the interpretation of logophoric reflexives. 
Therefore, if a contrast obtains between the two reflexive conditions, it is 
expected to reflect an increase in processing load during the interpretation of 
logophoric reflexives, in comparison to the processing of coargument 
reflexives. This increase should surface as a higher RT to the lexical decision 
task in the logophoric condition.  
The essential position to prove the predictions of the two representational 
approaches to reflexivity is then the experimental position, at which the probe 
was presented immediately after hearing the reflexive. This is considered the 
critical position, because at this point the resources that are required during the 
processing of the reflexive can be measured in order to determine whether the 





Results show that whereas in the control position (right before the reflexive) 
there was no difference in RT (t(17)= -0.46, p=.32), the experimental position 
(right after the reflexive) registered a higher RT for the logophoric reflexives 
(Table 1). Statistical analysis revealed significantly higher RTs for logophoric 
reflexives than coargument reflexives for both a subject analysis (t(26)= 2.71, 
p=.005) and an item analysis (t(49)=2.11, p=.01), thus indicating that the 
interpretation of logophoric reflexives is costlier to the processor than that of 
coargument reflexives.  
 
                                                           
6 It has been found that an increase in the number or kind of syntactic transformations does not 
result in more cost to the processor and that there is no correlation between a rise in derivational 
complexity and the complexity of psychological processes during sentence comprehension (Fodor, 
Bever & Garett 1974).  
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Table 1: Mean RT for conditions. 
  control position 
(before the reflexive) 
experimental position 
(after the reflexive) 
coargument reflexives 729.04 675.84 
logophoric reflexives 722.72 701.52 
   
significance p = .32 p =.005 
 
 
Moreover, in further statistical analyses, no sequence effects or other sources of 
interference were found. This is important as it indicates that the difference 
observed in the experimental position can be fully credited to the nature of the 





In light of the two competing representational accounts of reflexivity presented 
above, the statistically significant difference, which has been found for 
logophoric reflexives over coargument reflexives, provides evidence for the 
representational framework of the syntax+discourse position. The difference 
suggests that the interpretation of logophoric reflexives poses a higher burden 
on the processor than that of coargument reflexives. Assuming that additional 
cost to the processor is an indication for a switch between levels of 
information, such a burden is in turn only compatible with the 
syntax+discourse position that claims that the interpretation of logophoric 
reflexives requires access to extra-syntactic (discourse) information. It is 
precisely this extra process that is reflected in the higher RT. The reasoning is 
the following: The comprehension and interpretation of logophoric reflexives 
(primary task) appears to require a higher effort, which reduces the amount of 
resources available for the secondary lexical decision task and thus causes a 
higher RT in this condition.The obtained results therefore support the 
predictions that can be made on the basis of the syntax+discourse position. 
They favor the notion that logophoric reflexives need additional linguistic 
levels for interpretation and are thus subject to processing above and beyond 
syntactic demands. They further demonstrate that the two types of reflexives do 
not pattern alike. The findings therefore also indicate that the predications 
made in the context of the syntax-only position are not borne out. 
These results are further consistent with recent findings from language 
acquisition and neuro-imaging studies. In imaging, results have shown that 
errors involving the two types of reflexives yield different activation patterns of 
event-related brain potentials, thus suggesting the existence of syntactic and 
extra-syntactic processes (Harris, Wexler & Holcomb (to appear)). In language 
acquisition, it has been observed that children have more difficulties 
interpreting logophoric reflexives than coargument reflexives (Avrutin & 
 Petra Burkhardt 26
Cunningham 1997); these difficulties are considered to be caused by a resource 
limitation in connection with the processor’s need for additional resources to 
access extra-syntactic information. 
To conclude, the study presented here provides evidence for the extra-
syntactic nature of logophoricity. It further demonstrates how psycholinguistic 
data can be used to decide between competing representational approaches in 
general and the two approaches concerning reflexivity in particular, as the 
distinction between levels of information (e.g. syntax vs. discourse) is reflected 
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